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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Share the 
Costs of Cooperating Healthcare Networks 
 
Jay M. Lightfoot  
University of Northern Colorado 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The growing demand for healthcare services combined with the disarray in the 
health insurance market in the United States has created a situation where rival 
health networks are aggressively competing by building duplicate health facilities 
and providing redundant services in localized geographic regions. Unfortunately, 
this strategy can reduce the quality of patient care and decrease profits (Kaissi & 
Charland, 2013). A solution to this problem is for health networks to cooperate and 
share healthcare equipment, facilities, and personnel. Toward that end, this paper 
presents a game-theoretic method that can share these costs in a fair, efficient, and 
repeatable manner. 
 
KEYWORDS: Cooperative game-theory, Shapley simplification, joint venture, 
healthcare networks 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The healthcare industry in the United States is in disarray.  The combination of an 
aging population, instability in the insurance market due to the uncertainty of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), soaring healthcare costs due, in part, to excessive 
litigation, and inefficient “fee-for-service” billing practices have created a very 
difficult situation for all healthcare stakeholders.  Insurance companies struggle to 
determine how much to charge for coverage while physicians feel hamstrung in 
their ability to provide proper care within the limitations of insurance coverage.  
Hospital administrators attempt to balance the needs of patients, care-givers, and 
stockholders while still adhering to government rules and regulations.  Finally, 
patients are forced to navigate a byzantine system where they are often required to 
purchase a service without having any idea how much it will cost or who will pay 
for it. Clearly, this is far from an optimal situation. 
 
A conspicuous consequence of this chaotic environment is the proliferation of 
healthcare provider facilities by competing health networks, often within relatively 
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small geographic areas (Levine & Linder, 2016).  The primary intent of this strategy 
is to capture insured (i.e., paying) customers through convenience and proximity to 
services (Chang, et al., 2015; Fine & Frazier, 2011).  This is especially true for 
emergency trauma facilities, since rules exist that require transport to the closest 
trauma center with the appropriate trauma-level rating.  On the surface, this tactic 
appears beneficial to consumers because competition normally lowers prices while 
easier access to services should be advantageous to healthcare customers.  
However, an unintended consequence of this trend is that it can lead to a situation 
where costs for health services increase, provider profits decrease, and community 
access to healthcare services potentially can be eroded (Kaissi, et al., 2013; Weiss, 
2004).  This is due, in part, to the unnecessary duplication of expensive healthcare 
equipment, facilities, and personnel. By working independently and eschewing 
cooperation, rival healthcare networks are missing a potential synergy that would 
benefit all. 
 
A better, more economically rational approach would be for competing health 
networks to share the cost of expensive medical equipment, facilities, and personnel 
through cooperative joint ventures so that all can utilize these resources in an 
efficient manner.  While not a universal solution to all the problems mentioned 
above, it could mitigate the costly consequence of healthcare resource duplication.  
Doing so would not violate the intent of existing antitrust legislation (Leibenluft, 
2015).  In addition, profitable operations could still continue through specialized 
services and dedicated facilities while the customer base as a whole would benefit 
through decreased costs. 
 
Unfortunately, this ideal solution has been difficult to achieve because it requires a 
method that is perceived as both fair and neutral to divide the cost of those 
healthcare resources among the competing participants.  This allocation algorithm 
would also need to be understandable and repeatable to incentivize participants to 
maintain a stable coalition.  With this in mind, the primary motivation for this 
research project is to introduce a cost sharing method with these characteristics and 
to determine its viability in a realistic competitive healthcare scenario.  This will 
not only help competing healthcare services in the United States, but is also 
applicable to healthcare systems that are more closely managed by the government 
in other countries. 
 
 
THE HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATOR’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
The factors responsible for the proliferation of healthcare facilities and services are 
extremely complex and cannot be understood merely by performing a review of the 
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literature. Consequently, the initial step taken in this project was to contact and 
interview the Chief Executive Officers (CEO) of three regional healthcare 
networks. The CEOs each had over 30 years of healthcare administrative 
experience and oversee, in total, thirteen acute and critical care hospitals in the 
Colorado and Wyoming region.  The intent of the interviews was to gather their 
perspectives on the current healthcare environment and to gauge their reaction to 
the notion of sharing the cost of healthcare resources.  Overall, the CEO’s 
responses, which are summarized below, were surprisingly consistent and were 
quite useful in focusing this research on areas where it has the best chance for 
successful implementation.  
 
Extreme Competition 
 
The CEOs confirmed that the level of competition in the healthcare market is very 
high.  One used the word “predatory” to describe the interaction between competing 
networks while another used the word “ferocious.”  When asked about healthcare 
construction, one mentioned that the current flurry of construction of new facilities 
was not based on anticipated demand, but rather was intended to lure customers 
from the other networks.  While it is true that demand for healthcare services is 
growing, the CEOs related that consumer demand is not growing fast enough to 
justify the current level of new construction projects.  
 
Healthcare Culture 
 
Each CEO stated that the healthcare culture does not naturally encourage sharing 
and cooperation.  One said that he could not think of a single case where two 
competing health networks had decided to collaborate on a joint purchasing 
venture.  This indicates that there is a strong streak of independence in the 
healthcare profession.  This is particularly true with physicians, who generally like 
to think of themselves as autonomous agents.  This tendency is tempered by the 
reality that they require access to expensive hospital resources to practice medicine; 
however, there is still a residual culture that resists sharing unless necessary.  
Evidence of this can be found in the adherence to the inefficient and confusing “fee-
for-service” billing practice favored by the industry.  Despite this, the CEOs were 
united in their optimism that the culture was changing and that cooperative ventures 
were inevitable given the expense of new technology and the impact of the 
Affordable Care Act. 
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Dynamic Environment 
 
It goes without saying that the healthcare environment is dynamic.  New medical 
procedures are continually being developed and the legal landscape of healthcare 
insurance in the United States is rapidly changing.  Because of this, the CEOs 
interviewed were hesitant to give specific predictions about the level or type of 
resource sharing that is likely to occur.  However, all were confident that joint 
ventures would Increase and that healthcare would improve for consumers in the 
future. 
 
“Medical Arms Race” 
 
A common theme voiced during the interviews was that healthcare networks are 
engaged in a “medical arms race” that requires competing networks to acquire the 
latest medical equipment in an effort to demonstrate their cutting-edge status.  As 
one CEO put it, “First we had to have MRI machines, then we had to have PET 
scanners, now everybody expects us to have Di Vinci [robot surgery] devices.”  
Modern medical equipment is extremely expensive and, according to the 
interviews, not always efficiently utilized; however, from a marketing standpoint it 
is required to present the image of a healthcare network on the “bleeding-edge” of 
technology.  The downside of this race is that the utilization of these devices is 
generally too low to recoup fully the initial cost before the next new technology is 
introduced.  This was viewed by one of the CEOs as a factor that will encourage 
resource sharing in the future. 
 
Healthcare Marketing 
 
Competing health networks are very concerned about the perceived marketing 
image of their brand.  The image they want to project is one of professional 
competence, caring, convenience, and high technology.  Along these lines, the 
convenience factor is a prime motivator for new construction projects.  The 
rationale is that placing healthcare facilities near the customer has a better chance 
of capturing market share.  One CEO related a story about how the location for a 
new hospital facility was chosen specifically because it was mid-way between two 
hospitals of a competing chain, effectively diminishing the convenience of the 
competition.  Based upon the interviews, it is obvious that this type of thinking is a 
prime reason why collaborative ventures have been rare in the past. 
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Other Constraints to Cooperation 
 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the CEOs identified additional barriers 
to cooperation.  First are the rules used to accredit trauma centers into the various 
trauma levels within the system.  Achievement of a particular trauma center level 
depends on the on-site availability of specific resources and personnel.  Centers 
with the higher trauma levels provide more elaborate services.  If a center depends 
on remote, shared resources it would likely be certified at a lower trauma level 
which would reduce its status in the region.  Given that trauma patients are usually 
admitted into the hospital associated with the center, this could reduce patient 
counts and profits.  A second constraint to collaborative ventures relates to the 
population density of the geographic area.  Some medical services that could easily 
be shared in a high-density metropolitan area cannot in rural areas where the 
distance between care units is unreasonably large.  Essentially, the level of care 
would decrease if patients were expected to travel long distances to utilized shared 
services and resources.  Finally, there is concern about anti-trust legislation and 
how existing anti-trust laws will be applied in the new era of the Affordable Care 
Act.  While the ACA encourages cooperation and consolidation, there is a good 
deal of ambiguity concerning how the courts will interpret its application.  The 
CEOs are wary of running afoul of government regulators and facing an anti-trust 
lawsuit.  The primary take-away from these concerns was that cooperative sharing 
is desirable but cannot be all-encompassing across all healthcare resources.  Thus, 
the constraints listed above impose boundaries on the viable sharing options. 
 
Likely Sharing Opportunities 
 
The information gathered through the interviews indicated that cooperative joint 
ventures for all medical resources is unlikely; however, the CEOs did have several 
suggestions on areas where sharing across competing networks is possible and 
desirable.  Specifically, the shared clinic facility building could be shared if 
centrally located along with medical imaging equipment (e.g., MRI, PET scan, Di 
Vinci devices) as long as it was scheduled appropriately.  This would not be feasible 
for trauma centers due to the certification rules, but could work in other, non-
emergency settings, especially in densely populated metropolitan areas.  In 
addition, specialized personnel such as radiologists and surgeons were prime 
candidates for sharing since they can be scheduled and their skills shared across 
multiple locations.  Finally, ancillary services such as ambulance, pharmacy, 
laundry, data processing, insurance, and bill collections were identified as likely 
candidates for cost sharing.  Based on this knowledge, these are the areas on which 
this research focused. 
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PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
A large body of research exists concerning the various ways to share the cost of 
cooperative joint ventures.  A key concern throughout this literature is that these 
costs be shared in a “fair” manner that creates a stable coalition.  That is, a sharing 
solution where there is no incentive to break away from the coalition and proceed 
independently.  Solutions with this characteristic are formerly said to be in the core.  
Sharing solutions without a core are possible, but there would be economic pressure 
for one or more of the participants to leave the coalition, so they tend to be less 
stable (Buchholz, Haupt, & Peters, 2014).  Other desirable characteristics include a 
solution that is efficient (i.e., fully allocates the cost or savings), repeatable (i.e., 
not negotiated), and understandable.  Of these characteristics, the one that is most 
ambiguous is that the allocation be “fair.”  This is due to the fact that fairness is in 
the eye of the beholder and is often a severe obstacle to cooperation (Cruijssen, 
Cools, & Dullaert, 2007).  Common perspectives on fairness include the following 
(Kolker, 2014; Thomson, 2016): 
 
• Equal division – Share the cost equally among all participants.  This is 
sometimes called egalitarian division. 
• Proportional division – Allocate the cost in proportion to some other factor such 
as gross sales or proportional use of the resource. 
• Negotiated division – Share the cost based on cooperation and compromise. 
• Pareto Optimal division – Divide the cost or savings in a balanced way so that 
no one can benefit without harming other participants in the joint venture. 
 
Egalitarian methods tend to be unstable because the solution would seldom be in 
the core and some participants could fare better by proceeding independently.  
Likewise, proportional division tends to generate solutions that vary significantly 
from stability (Özener, Ergun, & Savelsbergh, 2013; Verdonck, Beullens, Caris, 
Ramaekers, & Janssens, 2016).  Negotiated division can produce stable results that 
are efficient, but the negotiation process is time-consuming and costly and the 
results may not be repeatable due to the dynamic nature of the process (Bond & 
Gasser, 1988).  Hence, for the purposes of this research, the Pareto Optimal 
approach to fairness will be pursued because it is the most likely to produce stable, 
predictable, and repeatable solutions.  It is also the approach that best aligns with 
the competitive healthcare environment described by the hospital CEOs.   
 
Surprisingly, given the large number of possible cost sharing methods, the literature 
in this area has focused on relatively few approaches with the desirable theoretical 
and empirical characteristics mentioned above (Anshelevich et al., 2008).  Of these, 
the Nucleolus and the Shapley value are the two most promising (Kolker, 2014; 
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Owen, 1995).  Both the Nucleolus and the Shapley value can produce stable, 
efficient, unique (i.e., single point) solutions that would be in the core for joint 
ventures in the healthcare environment (Fiestras-Janeiro, Garcia-Jurado, & 
Mosquera, 2011; Guajardo & Rönnqvist, 2016; Schmeidler, 1969).  These solutions 
would also be Pareto Optimal and repeatable.  However, a key concern with the 
Nucleolus approach is that it is not a formula-based calculation.  It instead relies on 
complex iterative linear programming techniques that can be difficult to setup and 
apply (Guajardo & Rönnqvist, 2016; Kolker, 2018).  In addition, it can produce 
solutions where some participants pay less if the total cost increases or pay more if 
the total cost decreases, thus setting up undesirable incentives (Kolker, 2018).  This 
limits its usefulness in real-world situations.  Consequently, the Shapley value was 
the method chosen for this research project because it exhibits all the desirable 
solution characteristics and is considered fair (in the Pareto Optimal sense), 
equitable, stable, and neutral by virtually all researchers (Boatsman, Hansen, & 
Kimbrell, 1981; Frechette, et al., 2016). 
 
 
SHAPLEY VALUE COST SHARING 
 
The Shapley value is a game-theoretic approach that provides a potential solution 
to the cost allocation problem addressed by this research.  The Shapley value was 
developed by Lloyd Shapley in 1953 as an algorithmic way for players in an 
abstract game to determine the outcome of that game prior to actually playing it 
(Shapley, 1953).  Since its development, the Shapley value has been used in a wide 
variety of real-world contexts.  It has, for example, been used in the areas of 
electricity transmission allocation, freight transportation, natural resource sharing, 
determining uncertainty factors in simulation models, and evaluating deposit 
insurance premiums (Fiestras-Janeiro, et al., 2011; Guajardo & Rönnqvist, 2016; 
Song, Nelson, & Staum, 2016; Staum, 2012).  In the healthcare context, it has been 
used to identify gene sub-groups prominent in ovarian cancer research, optimize 
supply chain networks for hospitals, and help reduce false alarms in intensive care 
units (Afghah, Razi, & Najarian, 2015; Mohebbi, 2015; Razi, Afghah, & Varadan, 
2015).  
 
The result generated by the Shapley value is a unique, single-point solution that 
allocates to each participant the average of the marginal cost that participant creates 
by joining the collaborative venture (Guajardo & Rönnqvist, 2016).  Said another 
way, the Shapley value generates a solution that is at the “center of gravity of the 
extreme points of core” when the core exists (Shapley, 1971).  The formula to 
calculate the Shapley value is given below (Shapley, 1953).   
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           𝑥𝑖 = ∑  [
(𝑠−1)! (𝑛−𝑠)!
𝑛!
]𝑠  ∗ [𝑐(𝑆) − 𝑐(𝑆 −  [𝑖])]      (1) 
Where:  
c = coalitions of players 
n = number of players in the “grand coalition” 
n! = number of coalition permutations 
i =  an  individual player 
s = number of coalitions containing i 
xi = cost allocated to player i 
c(S) = coalition containing S 
[c(S) - c(S-[i])] = contribution that an individual player makes to a 
coalition 
 
The Shapley formula is relatively easy to apply, so it has the benefit of being 
understandable and repeatable.  Its use, however, has been somewhat limited 
because the information requirements needed to calculate the value grow 
exponentially as the number of players (i.e., participants) in the joint venture 
increases.  For example, the Shapley value requires the development of 2n – 1 cost 
sharing scenarios where ‘n’ is the number of participants in the joint venture.  So, 
a 4-player game (i.e., joint venture) requires 15 cost scenarios, a 5-player game 
requires 31, and so on.  For any collaborative venture with more than a few 
participants, the information requirements quickly become overwhelming.  A 
solution to this limitation is to utilize simplifications to the Shapley value that have 
been developed for special classes of problems.  These simplifications generate 
identical allocations for any number of players without the corresponding 
computation and information burden.  Consequently, because of the favorable 
characteristics of the Shapley value and the existence of Shapley simplifications 
that can overcome the primary limitation to using it in practical contexts, the 
remainder of this research focuses on using Shapley simplifications to share the 
cost of healthcare collaborative ventures. 
 
SHAPLEY SIMPLIFICATIONS 
 
The healthcare environment described by the CEOs identified categories of 
resources that could be shared by three Shapley simplifications.  As mentioned 
previously, these simplifications generate the same results as the full Shapley value, 
but do not have unreasonable input data requirements.  Specifically, the data input 
requirements grow linearly with the number of players rather than exponentially.  
This characteristic allows the value to be calculated for much larger, realistic-sized, 
joint ventures.  The sections below introduce the simplifications and the Appendix 
of this paper demonstrates their potential use in sharing the cost of healthcare 
resources. 
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PARALLEL SYSTEM SIMPLIFICATION 
 
Littlechild and Owen (1973) developed a simplification for classes of shared 
resources with overlapping requirements where the cost to any subset of players is 
equal to the cost to the largest player.  
 
If a game vs has the structure 
vs  = 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑎
𝑏
𝑐
𝑏
𝑐
𝑐
𝑐]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where a ≤ b ≤ c, then its Shapley value is: 
x1 = 
1
3
 a 
x2 = 
1 
3
 a  +  
1
2
 (b – a)        (2) 
x3 = 
1
 3 
 a  +  
1
2
 (b – a)  + (c – b) 
 
 
SERIAL SYSTEM SIMPLIFICATION 
 
The cost of another class of resources can be shared by determining the total 
quantity of the resource required and multiplying it by the cost for each “unit.”  This 
is appropriate for resources that are independently purchased and used solely by 
each player in the game.  Using this simplification produces the same sharing 
solution as using the full Shapley value (Lightfoot, 1990). 
 
If a game vs has the structure 
vs  = 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑎
𝑏
𝑐
𝑎 + 𝑏
𝑎 + 𝑐
𝑏 + 𝑐
𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐]
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 then its Shapley value is: 
x1 = a 
x2 = b         (3) 
x3 = c 
 
 
STEPWISE SERIAL SIMPLIFICATION 
 
Some resources must be purchased in pre-determined, indivisible quantities or 
capacities.  For example, if a coalition of healthcare providers wants to share the 
cost of several ultrasound devices, these machines must be acquired in whole 
“units,” that is, no partial ultrasound devices can be purchased.  So, if 3.3 ultrasound 
machines were needed by the joint venture, the coalition would buy 4 to satisfy the 
demand.  This type of “lumpy” resource can be shared using the stepwise serial 
simplification as shown below (Lightfoot, 1990). 
 
If a game vs has the structure  
vs   =  
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑣(1)
𝑣(2)
𝑣(3)
𝑣(12)
𝑣(13)
𝑣(23)
𝑣(123)]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           =          
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑚1
𝑚2
𝑚3
𝑚12
𝑚13
𝑚23
𝑚123]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where M1, M2, … are the available resource sizes, then its Shapley value is: 
x1 =m1 +  
1
2
 (m12-m1-m2) 
+  
1
2
 (m13-m1-m3) 
+  
1
3
 (m123-(m12+m13+m23-m1-m2-m3)) 
x2 = m2 +  
1
2
 (m12-m1-m2) 
 +  
1
2
 (m23-m2-m3)        (4) 
 +  
1
3
 (m123-(m12+m13+m23-m1-m2-m3)) 
 
x3 = m3 +  
1
2
 (m13-m1-m3) 
 +  
1
2
 (m23-m2-m3) 
 +  
1
3
 (m123-(m12+m13+m23-m1-m2-m3)) 
 
=    Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥a} 
=    Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥b} 
=    Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥c} 
=    Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥a+b} 
=    Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥a+c} 
=    Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥b+c} 
=    Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥a+b+c} 
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All three simplifications, when applied to the proper class of resource, will result 
in a sharing solution identical to what would be produced using the full Shapley 
value.  In addition, all three are generalizable to sharing coalitions with any number 
of players.  This removes the primary limitation to using Shapley allocations in 
practical contexts.  The following section will demonstrate its use in a healthcare 
example. 
 
 
APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH 
 
For this illustration, assume that three competing hospitals form a joint venture to 
share the cost of a centralized imaging clinic with DNA sequencing capabilities in 
a large metropolitan area.  The initial arrangement is to share the cost of the clinic 
facility, a CT scanner, DNA sequencers, a team of radiologists, computers, and 
laundry service.  Later, depending upon the success of the collaboration, the cost of 
other resources could be shared.  The characteristics of the shared resources are 
described below. 
 
• The three hospitals have overlapping requirements for the clinic facility with 
hospital A needing a 9,000 ft2 facility and hospitals B and C requiring 15,000 
ft2 and 19,000 ft2 respectively.  The building is estimated to have a final cost of 
$400 per square foot to complete.  Given that a large percentage of the clinic is 
devoted to waiting rooms and administrative offices, the group agreed that the 
19,000 ft2 building will satisfy all three.   
• Radiologist cost an average of $400,000 per year in the metropolitan area.  
Hospital A anticipates a workload requiring .8 of a full-time radiologist while 
hospital B would need 2.1 and C would require 2.7.  Since radiologists can only 
be “purchased” in whole units, the clinic will hire a team of 6 radiologists to 
handle the workload.   
• Laundry service, while a minor clinic expense, is representative of several 
ancillary services that could eventually be shared.  Laundry service can be 
purchased for 60 cents a pound with a 10% quantity discount on loads exceeding 
500 pounds.  Hospital A anticipates generating 50 pounds of laundry a week 
and B and C will produce 150 and 175 pounds per week respectively.  This 
shared total will not qualify for the quantity discount, so the cost sharing 
allocation will use the serial simplification initially.  Later, if the volume 
exceeds 500 pounds, the stepwise simplification can be used to allocate the cost.   
• The clinic requires a shared CT scanner, several DNA sequencers, and 
computers for the staff.  The resource details and associated costs of these 
resources are provided in the Appendix of this paper.  The Appendix also 
demonstrates how to apply the simplifications to calculate a cost sharing 
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solution.  The results of all the cost allocations in the joint venture are shown in 
Table 1.  This table also shows what the cost to each hospital and the collective 
would have been without the joint venture. 
 
 
Table 1: Cost Allocation for 3-Hospital Example 
 
Resource 
Purchase 
Scenario 
Hospital A 
$ 
Hospital B 
$ 
Hospital C 
$ 
Total 
Cost $ 
Simplificat
ion 
CT 
Scanner 
No Joint 
Venture 
400,000 1,000,000 2,500,000 
3,900,00
0 
  
Shapley 
Allocation 
133,333.3
3 
433,333.3
3 
1,933,333
.33 
2,500,00
0 
Parallel 
DNA 
Sequenc
ers 
No Joint 
Venture 
2,550,000 1,700,000 850,000 
5,100,00
0 
  
Shapley 
Allocation 
1,983,333
.33 
1,558,333
.33 
708,333.3
3 
4,250,00
0 
Stepwise 
Laundry 
Service 
No Joint 
Venture 
300 390 570 1,260   
Shapley 
Allocation 
300 390 570 1,260 Serial 
Compute
rs 
No Joint 
Venture 
25,000 44,000 63,000 132,000   
Shapley 
Allocation 
18,933.33 33,533.33 54,733.33 107,200 Stepwise 
Radiolog
ist 
No Joint 
Venture 
400,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 
2,800,00
0 
  
Shapley 
Allocation 
333,333.3
3 
933,333.3
3 
1,133,333
.33 
2,400,00
0 
Stepwise 
Clinic 
Facility 
No Joint 
Venture 
3,600,000 6,000,000 7,600,000 
17,200,0
00 
  
Shapley 
Allocation 
1,200,000 2,400,000 4,000,000 
7,600,00
0 
Parallel 
Total 
Allocatio
n $ 
No Joint 
Venture 
6,975,300 9,944,390 
12,213,57
0 
29,133,2
60 
 
Shapley 
Allocation 
3,669,233 5,358,923 7,830,303 
16,858,4
60 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The key to using the Shapley value to allocate resource costs for cooperating 
healthcare providers is to classify the individual resources based upon their 
characteristics and then apply the appropriate simplification to each.  These 
individual costs can then be added together to determine the total cost allocated to 
each participant.  This not only makes the problem computationally easier, but also 
aligns with the sharing environment described by the hospital administrators.  If the 
resources are not treated separately, a Shapley solution can still be calculated, but 
it would require creating 2n - 1 coalition cost scenarios and using the original 
Shapley formula.  While not a major problem in the proof-of-concept clinic 
example, a larger coalition of hospitals would require an unreasonable number of 
scenarios.  Thus, the simplifications allow Shapley value allocations to be applied 
in a real-world context. 
 
The three-hospital solution shown in Table 1 shares the cost of six resources.  The 
table provides the outcome of using the Shapley simplifications and of proceeding 
independently for each resource.  Based on the results shown in Table 1, each 
hospital, and the collective as a whole, will save a significant amount of money by 
cooperating.  Three of these resources are shared using the stepwise simplification, 
two are shared with the parallel simplification, and one uses the serial 
simplification.  The decision concerning which simplification to use depends on the 
characteristics of the resource.  For example, the stepwise simplification was used 
for the DNA sequencer, computer, and radiologist resources because each of these 
must be purchased in whole units.  You cannot buy a fractional DNA sequencer; 
consequently, the general rule for this category is that the cost of any medical 
resource that must be purchased in indivisible units (with or without quantity 
discount) can be shared using the stepwise simplification.  The CT scanner and the 
clinic facility were shared using the parallel simplification because a larger resource 
(i.e., a bigger building and more advanced CT scanner) would satisfy the needs of 
the hospitals with more modest requirements.  For this category, the general rule is 
to use the parallel simplification when a larger capacity resource can satisfy users 
with smaller requirements.  Finally, the serial simplification was used for the shared 
laundry service.  This resource is representative of a category of ancillary services 
that would need to be shared to create a workable joint venture.  It would not be 
reasonable to expect each hospital to independently contract with a separate laundry 
service for the clinic.  Even if sharing the cost of laundry services did not save any 
money, the logistics and complexity of not sharing would be burdensome.  
(However, with sufficient volume, quantity discounts would likely be offered which 
would result in a cost savings.)  The same would be true for similar clinic functions 
such as bill collection and pharmacy services.  So, the serial simplification is 
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applicable for those healthcare situations where the service/resource is required, the 
units of service used are variable and divisible, and it would be impractical not to 
cooperate in the purchase. 
 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The research presented in this paper was intended to show proof-of-concept and the 
viability of the cost sharing technique in a realistic hospital scenario.  The resource 
requirements used in the case scenario were derived directly from information 
provided by the hospital CEOs.  Likewise, the prices used in the case were based 
on the current actual cost of the equipment and resources listed in the scenario.  The 
cost sharing method is applicable to coalitions of any size due to the characteristics 
of the Shapley Value and its simplifications; consequently, it is not limited to the 
“3-player game” used in the example case.  Given this, the first phase of the research 
project was successful. 
 
Subsequent work on this project will involve communicating the results of the 
research to the hospital CEOs originally interviewed.  The intent is to gauge their 
acceptance of the approach and to collect more information about possible 
applications. This information will be used to refine the technique and possibly 
account for other real-world factors such as the impact when hospitals of 
significantly different sizes cooperate and how the method could be used when 
healthcare networks merge. These are realistic considerations that will make the 
technique more robust. The outcome of this phase of the research project will 
hopefully lead to its application in an actual healthcare cost sharing venture. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The healthcare industry is currently underutilizing its capital and human resources 
by pursuing unnecessary, and economically unwise, competition.  The result of this 
strategy has been shown to decrease provider profits and negatively impact the 
quality of patient care (Kaissi & Charland, 2013).  It is possible and desirable for 
competing health networks to cooperate in targeted joint ventures to mitigate this 
problem.  Toward that end, this paper has demonstrated an approach using 
simplifications of the Shapley value that will make it easier to setup stable 
collaborative joint ventures between competing healthcare networks. 
 
The application of this approach was illustrated using a realistic example where 
three hospitals cooperated to share the cost of an imaging clinic.  The results of 
A Game Theoretic Apporach to Share the Cost of Cooperating Healthcare Networks                             Jay Lightfoot 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017         16         ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
applying the Shapley simplifications to the example confirm that the sharing 
solution produced is stable because each hospital saves money by cooperating and 
no hospital (or sub-group of hospitals) can do better by breaking away from the 
joint venture.  In addition, the solution is fair, in the Pareto Optimal sense, because 
no hospital can be allocated a smaller cost without another hospital having to pay 
more.  It divides the total cost of the resources (no more, no less) and is formula-
based, so it is efficient and repeatable.  Finally, the solution produced for the clinic 
is understandable in that it does not require knowledge of game theory or advanced 
mathematics to apply. 
 
The Shapley simplifications themselves do not have unreasonable input data 
requirements; therefore, they overcome the primary limitation to applying the 
Shapley value to non-trivial problems.  For the Serial and Parallel simplifications, 
one data value is needed for each player in the coalition; so, a 10-player coalition 
would only need 10 input data values.  The Stepwise simplification does require   
2n – 1 inputs; however, only one value for each player must be provided.  The 
remaining inputs can be generated by merely adding together and rounding up the 
requirements of the individual players to the next whole unit.  Thus, the approach 
is computationally feasible for large joint ventures where economies of scale are 
greater. 
 
There are limits to the type of resources that could, in practice, be shared in a 
collaboration among competing healthcare networks.  As previously noted, 
emergency room trauma centers are not good candidates for resource sharing due 
to certification requirements.  Also, services where real-time turn-around is 
required would not easily be shared.  For example, tissue pathology diagnosis is 
often required during surgery to determine if more aggressive procedures are 
required.  The lab performing the diagnosis of the samples needs to be close to the 
surgery center, so a remote shared pathology lab would not work.  Also, sharing 
any critical medical resource in remote rural areas is problematic due to the travel 
time involved in reaching the shared site.  Despite these situations where sharing in 
not feasible, a broad range of other collaborative opportunities are available.  By 
utilizing the approach introduced in this paper, it will be possible for competing 
healthcare networks to take advantage of the economic synergies available through 
collaboration and cooperation. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The calculations below apply the Shapley simplifications to several of the resources 
listed in the 3-hospital case.  Note: a “3-player” joint venture scenario was used to 
demonstrate the viability of the cost sharing method.  While the simplifications 
produce results identical to using the full Shapley value with coalitions of any size, 
this case was limited to three hospitals to reduce the complexity of the example. 
 
 
CT SCANNER 
 
Parallel Simplification: The three hospital networks will purchase and share use 
of a new Aquilion One Vision CT scanner.  Hospital X1 has modest general-
imaging requirements and wants a 16-slice scanner ($400,000) to meet their needs.  
Hospital X2 has higher volume requirements and also wishes to offer vascular 
imaging services which need better quality images, so they require a 128-slice 
system ($1,000,000).  Finally, hospital X3 wishes to setup a cutting-edge imaging 
facility capable of high volume cardio studies; consequently, they require a 640-
slice scanner ($2,500,000).  Given the expected usage volume, all three hospitals 
could share a single 640-slice machine with this cost allocation.   
 
     Resource Cost             Player Requirement              Cost to “go it alone” 
16-slice:       $ 400,000         S(1):    16-slice    $400,000     X1  =   400,000 
128-slice:  $ 1,000,000         S(2):  128-slice $1,000,000     X2 = 1,000,000 
640-slice:  $ 2,500,000         S(3):  640-slice $2,500,000    X3 = 2,500,000 
   ========== 
     $ 3,900,000 
 
 
     Shapley Sharing Solution 
X1 = ⅓ (400,000)          =   133,333.33 
X2 = ⅓(400,000) + ½(1,000,000 – 400,000)      =    433,333.33 
X3 = ⅓(400,000) + ½(1,000,000 – 400,000) + (2,5000,000 – 1,000,000) = 1,933,333.34 
          ============ 
           $  2,500,000.00 
 
 
AUTOMATED DNA SEQUENCING 
 
Stepwise Simplification: The three hospitals also wish to acquire automated DNA 
sequencing equipment that will allow them to do in-house DNA analysis.  After 
reviewing available products, it is decided that the Illumina NovaSeq 5000 system, 
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at an installed cost of $850,000, offers the best combination of features and 
capacity.  Based on anticipated volume, hospital X1 requires 2.1 sequencers, 
hospital X2 requires 1.4 sequencers, and hospital X3 requires .7 sequencers.  Given 
that only whole units can be purchased (that is, you cannot purchase fractional 
sequencers), the joint venture will require the purchase of 5 machines.  The 
allocation to divide the $4,250,000 is:  
 
          Resource Cost       Player Requirements             Cost to “go it alone” 
1 sequencer:       $850,000  S(1):       2.1      $ 2,550,000  X1 = 2,550,000 
2 sequencers:  $1,700,000  S(2):       1.4      $ 1,700,000  X2 = 1,700,000 
3 sequencers:  $2,550,000  S(3):        .7       $    850,000  X3 =    850,000 
4 sequencers:  $3,400,000  S(12):    4.0       $ 3,400,000       ========= 
5 sequencers:  $4,250,000  S(13):    3.0       $ 2,550,000           $ 5,100,000 
    S(23):    3.0       $ 2,550,000 
    S(123):  5.0       $ 4,250,000 
 
Shapley Sharing Solution 
X1 = 2,550,000 + ½(3,400,000-2,550,000-1,700,000) +  
½(2,550,000-2,550,000-850,000) +  
⅓(4,250,000-(3,400,000+2,550,000+2,550,000 - 
    2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000))      =    $ 1,983,333.33 
 
 
X2 = 1,700,000 + ½(3,400,000-2,550,000-1,700,000) +  
½(2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000) +  
⅓(4,250,000-(3,400,000+2,550,000+2,550,000 – 
    2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000))      =    $ 1,558,333.33 
 
X3 = 850,000+ ½(2,550,000-2,550,000-850,000) +  
         ½(2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000) +  
         ⅓(4,250,000-(3,400,000+2,550,000+2,550,000 – 
  2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000))      =     $    708,333.34 
             ============ 
                $ 4,250,000.00 
 
 
 
COMPUTERS 
 
Serial Simplification: The hospitals in the collaborative venture plan to purchase 
computers to be used by in the clinic.  Their requirements are as follows: hospital 
X1 needs 10, hospital X2 needs 22, and hospital X3 needs 35.  The notebook 
computers cost $2,500 each and would not be shared between users.  Without 
quantity discounts, the cost division is as follows. 
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Cost Each       Player Requirements     Shapley Sharing Solution 
$2,500   S(1):  10   X1 = 10  * 2,500  =    25,000 
   S(2):  22   X2 = 22  * 2,500  =    55,000 
   S(3):  35   X3 = 35  * 2,500  =    87,500 
          ======= 
         $ 167,500 
 
Stepwise Simplification: Quantity discounts are common when purchasing large 
numbers of computers, so assume that a volume purchasing agreement for 
computers was negotiated with the following price schedule. 
 
 Quantity    Cost each 
1 to 10      $2,500  
11 to 25      $2,000 
26 to 50      $1,800 
     > 51      $1,600 
 
Using the stepwise simplification, the cost sharing solution for the joint purchase 
would be: 
 
       Player Requirements              Cost to “go it alone” 
S(1):         10 * 2500 = $  25,000   X1 = 25,000 
S(2):         22 * 2000 = $  44,000   X2 = 44,000 
S(3):         35 * 1800 = $  63,000   X3 = 63,000 
S(12):       32 * 1800 = $  57,600        ======= 
S(13):       45 * 1800 = $  81,000      $ 132,000 
S(23):       57 * 1600 = $  91,200 
S(123):     67 * 1600 = $107,200 
 
Shapley Sharing Solution 
X1 = 25,000 + ½(57,600-25,000-44,000) + ½(81,000-25,000-63,000) +  
⅓(107,200-(57,600+81,000+91,200-25,000-44,000-63,000))   =     $  18,933.33 
 
X2 = 44,000 + ½(57,600-25,000-44,000) + ½(91,200-44,000-63,000) +  
⅓(107,200-(57,600+81,000+91,200-25,000-44,000-63,000))   =    $   33,533.33 
 
X3 = 63,000+ ½(81,000-25,000-63,000) + ½(91,200-44,000-63,000) + =     $   54,733.33 
             ========== 
              $ 107,200.00 
 
